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t
Corporate and securities laws are seen as mitigating corporate fraud by
manipulating the incentives of agents: presenting corporate agents with a
probability of being caught and punished if they commit fraud. This Article
suggests that the same laws also affect corporate fraud in a significant but
unappreciated manner, by manipulating the perceptions of the principals:
affecting the principals' efforts in monitoring the agents by making them
perceive the risk offraud as more or less likely.
Due to several cognitive biases discussed in this Article, principals
misperceive the risk of fraud by their agents in a cyclical manner: they
underestimate the likelihood of fraud during booms and overestimate it
following busts. As a result, they insufficiently police the agents during booms
and excessively do so during busts.
Conspicuous law enforcement triggers cognitive biases that could be
thoughtfully used to counter the public's cyclical bias. But political pressures
that prosecutors face, as well as their failure to consider law enforcement's
effect on principals 'perceptions, result in enforcement that is itself cyclical and
may exacerbate the biased perception of the risk offraud.
Monetary policy is analogous in requiring counter-cyclical government
intervention, and central banks have successfully stepped up to the task despite
facing similar pressure not to intervene counter-cyclically. This Article
concludes by examining whether institutional safeguards that free central
banks to operate counter-cyclically can be adapted to the context of corporate
fraud.
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Introduction
Economic activity waxes and wanes in a cyclical pattern known as a
business cycle. 1 Central banks such as the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank mitigate
economic shocks by acting counter-cyclically in ways that slow down a
booming economy and boost a flagging economy. 2 This counter-cyclical
monetary policy affects economic activity not only through its objective effect
on the supply of money, but also through its impact on the public's
expectations of the economy's future. 3
1 To be more precise, business cycles represent fluctuations in the economy's long-term
growth path, rather than being the growth path itself. Robert J. Hodnck & Edward C. Prescott, Postwar
U.S. Business Cycles. An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1 (1997)
("[A]ggregate economic vanables in capitalist economies experience repeated fluctuations about their
long-term growth paths."). On the development of business cycle theory see, for example, Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory, 12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 696
(1980).
2 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 15, 16 (9th ed. 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/
pficomplete.pdf.
3 Anthony M. Santomero, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Address, Great
Expectations: Monetary Policy in Today's Economy (Jan. 10, 2002), available at
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Like monetary policy, the conspicuous enforcement of the branches of
securities and corporate law that address corporate fraud ("law enforcement")
4
impacts the public's expectations (or, more precisely, the public's risk
perception regarding fraud).5 This effect on risk perception impacts the degree
to which the public self-polices against fraud, the degree to which the public
avoids activities that are susceptible to fraud, and the degree to which the
public influences government to increase regulation that addresses fraud.
The effect of conspicuous law enforcement on potential victims' risk
perceptions is largely neglected in the literature, which focuses on the potential
perpetrators (rather than the potential victims) and on law's manipulation of
incentives that results in deterrence (rather than manipulation of risk perception
that affects the amount of self-policing).6
In this Article, I explore the policy implications of the effect of law
enforcement on risk perception, and ultimately the impact on social welfare.
Under certain circumstances discussed below, social welfare would benefit
from counter-cyclical patterns of law enforcement. 7 This conclusion runs
contrary to actual enforcement patterns, which tend to be cyclical. 8
This Article challenges the extant literature on optimal sanctions, which
views enforcement policy as a tradeoff between the benefits of deterrence and
the costs of enforcement, by adding a third consideration: the costs or benefits
of enforcement's effect on the public's risk perceptions. This Article also
introduces into the purely microeconomic extant analysis of optimal sanctions a
macroeconomic consideration: the cyclical fluctuation in perception of fraud,
which tracks the business cycle and significantly impacts the effect law
enforcement has on social welfare.
Part I examines what appear to be cyclical patterns in the public's
perception of the risk of fraud and in the enforcement of anti-fraud laws: the
risk of fraud seems greater, and the enforcement of anti-fraud laws increases,
after a slump in the business cycle as compared to during the boom segment of
the cycle. This explains why it is likely that cyclical misperceptions of fraud
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publicaffairs/speeches/santomero/2002/0 1-10-02_natl-economists-club.
cfm.
4 This Article focuses on conspicuous law enforcement in the context of mitigating corporate
fraud. However, the same analysis is applicable in many other contexts in which law is enforced
conspicuously.
5 See Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789 (2007) [hereinafter
Aviram, Bias Arbitrage]; Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law's Role in Manipulating
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006).
6 See, e.g, Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the Securities
Industry?, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 765 (2006); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction
of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47
ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 934 (2006); Betty Joan Thurber, A Behavioral Science Analysis ofSarbanes-Oxley 's
Certification Requirements- the Right Kind of Deterrence?, 7 TENN. J. Bus. L. 123 (2005).
7 See infra Part 11.
8 See infra Section I.B.
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would lead to a cyclical pattern of law enforcement, as law enforcers engage in
strategic behavior called "bias arbitrage."
9
Part II incorporates the cyclical pattern of risk perception into the
literature on optimal law enforcement. Conspicuous law enforcement sends a
dual-faceted signal to the public of both the existence of fraud and of fraud
being addressed by the law. Depending on circumstances discussed in this Part,
conspicuous law enforcement can either increase or decrease risk perception.
This Part goes on to analyze, under each of these scenarios, the effects of
conspicuous law enforcement on social welfare (and therefore optimal
enforcement policy). Under some circumstances, a social welfare-maximizing
law enforcement policy would need to be counter-cyclical, responding to and
mitigating the cyclical pattern of risk perception.
Part III examines how law enforcement can break from the mostly
cyclical enforcement pattern described in Part I to allow, when beneficial, the
facilitation of a counter-cyclical enforcement pattern. I examine areas in which
counter-cyclical policy is used-primarily in executing monetary policy-to
learn what features increase a law enforcer's ability to maintain a counter-
cyclical policy in the face of opposing political pressure. I then consider how
these features may be adopted in the context of anti-fraud law enforcement.
I. Cyclical Patterns in Fraud Perception and Anti-Fraud Law Enforcement
The common narrative on the impact of corporate law on fraud is an
evolutionary one: agents have an incentive to defraud the principal,10 but this
incentive is kept in check by law. To escape law's constraints, agents find and
exploit loopholes in the law. In response, the law is amended to close the
loopholes."' Thus, the substance of the law evolves, while its enforcement is
held constant, at the highest level possible under budgetary constraints.
While this narrative has some merit and influences the behavior of law
enforcers, it does not describe the only way-or perhaps even the most
significant way-in which corporate law affects fraud. Fraud is kept in check
not only by the deterrence of government sanctions, but also by the principals'
monitoring of their agents.12 The amount of such monitoring depends on the
9 Bias arbitrage will be explained in Section I.C and is explained in greater detail in Aviram,
Bias Arbitrage, supra note 5.
10 Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1423-25 (2002).
11 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765-66 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)) ("The new rule closes a
loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."); Joel Seligman, The
Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEo. L.J 1083, 1088-
89(1985).
12 In the context of corporate fraud, the agents are the corporate insiders (directors and
officers) who are potential perpetrators of fraud, while the principals are the parties who are potential
victims of such fraud (typically the shareholders). Not all principals have the same abilities to respond to
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principals' perception of the likelihood of fraud. Such perception is susceptible
to cognitive biases, and, I argue here, is likely to be cyclical: principals
perceive fraud as less likely (and reduce policing) during booms, and
overestimate the likelihood of fraud (and increase policing) following busts.
This Article suggests a complementary narrative that is cyclical rather
than evolutionary, focusing on the enforcement rather than the substance of
corporate and securities laws. The role of law in fighting fraud is not limited to
deterring fraud and incapacitating perpetrators, but may extend to de-biasing
principals' perceptions on fraud and therefore facilitating more effective private
responses to fraud. Even if prosecutors choose not to extend law's role, law
enforcement manipulates principals' perceptions, thus affecting principals' self-
policing. This, in turn, affects the prevalence of fraud. This effect is separate
from, and may be in the opposite direction of, law enforcement's effect on
fraud caused by its manipulation of agents' incentives.
For law's effects on risk perception to be considered in developing an
optimal enforcement policy, these effects must be predictable; i.e., follow a
certain pattern or patterns. Below I will argue why the risk perception of
corporate fraud follows a cyclical pattern that corresponds to the performance
of the stock market (and, indirectly, to business cycles). Following that, I will
present evidence that law enforcement efforts against corporate fraud follow
the same pattern. Then I will tie these two cyclical patterns together by
explaining why cyclical shifts in risk perception would likely result in cyclical
enforcement of the law.
A. Cyclical Biases in Perceiving the Risk of Fraud
Stock markets are volatile, but rather than shifting randomly their price
fluctuations tend to have trends that rotate cyclically: an upward trend during a
"bull market," followed by a downward trend during a "bear market." These
trends are shaped by numerous factors, from monetary policies to housing
prices to business cycles. Yet downward trends are perceived very frequently to
involve fraud and to be caused by fraud. 13 Thus, while there were a great
number of causes for the downward trend in U.S. stock prices between early
2000 and late 2002, this slump became associated with scandals in Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco and others.
fraud, but all principals can respond in some way to fraud. A dominant shareholder may monitor the
agents directly, replace them, or force institutional changes in the corporation that reduce the agents'
discretion and increase oversight. A shareholder with a smaller stake may not be able to effect these
changes, but could reduce or avoid investment in corporations she perceives to be susceptible to a high
risk of fraud.
13 See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 73-90 (4th ed. 2000) (providing many examples of fraud accompanying economic
panics); Tony Jackson, Investors Should Be Wary of Backlash over Top People's Pay, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2007, at 34 ("The fact that something goes in cycles, after all, does not mean it can be shrugged off.
Corporate crime is cyclical too.").
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The prevalence of fraud as the perceived cause of a stock market slump
should not be surprising. Most causes of stock price fluctuation are complex,
abstract and unintuitive (e.g., explaining why an increase in bank reserve
requirements or in the federal funds rate causes a drop in stock prices). Fraud-
insiders stealing the value that the stock has lost-is intuitive and vivid.
14
Many people exhibit a vividness bias that causes them to place more weight on
concrete, emotionally interesting information than on more probative abstract
data. 15 A causal explanation that is more concrete, vivid and easier to
understand is more likely to be perceived as the correct causal explanation.
Independent of its vividness, fraud is attractive as the causal explanation
for market slumps because it provides a perpetrator and a motive, both of which
are missing in complex economic causes. 16 For all of the above reasons, fraud
is an attractive explanation for stock market slumps.
Once fraud is deemed a likely cause of the slump, other causes are less
likely to be considered. People may tend to prefer a single explanatory cause to
an event over multiple causes.1 7 In a phenomenon known by psychologists as
"discounting," identifying a potential cause as more likely has the effect of
making all other potential causes seem less likely.IS For example, a lawn may
be wet because it rained, or because the sprinklers turned on. An individual
who is told that the sprinklers turned on may consider it less likely that it
rained, even though these causes are not mutually exclusive. 19
Similarly, once fraud seems a likely cause for a market slump, discounting
may cause people to ignore other causes of the slump, even though stock prices
are affected by a multitude of forces. Indeed, the public may continue to view
fraud as the cause of market slumps, even in the face of evidence casting doubt
as to the fraud's prevalence, as long as the fraud seems a more likely cause of
14 This portrayal of fraud as theft is simplistic, of course. Some instances of securities fraud
are forms of embezzlement. See, eg., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cit. 1990);
State v. Ross, 715 P.2d 471 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Swift, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
But many instances of securities fraud involve disclosure failures or misstatements that are not related to
embezzlement. For example, a CEO who knowingly presents an excessively optimistic assessment of
her company in order to buy time for it to improve its performance. E.g., Goplen v. 5Ijob, Inc. 453 F.
Supp. 2d 759, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re New York Cmty. Bankcorp, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 466
(E,D.N.Y. 2006); In re Spear, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
15 Harry S. Gerla, The "Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract
Values Receive Their Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199, 210 (1990) (citing RICHARD NISBETT & LEE
Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55-61 (1980))
16 Providing a perpetrator or a motive makes the cause seem more plausible. See, e.g.,
Margaret C. Campell, Perceptions of Price Unfairness: Antecedents and Consequences, 36 J.
MARKETING RES. 187, 197 (1999) (finding that an "inferred motive of the firm in setting a price is a
factor in consumers' perceptions of price unfairness").
17 See, e.g, Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Judging Probable Cause, 99 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3 (1986); Harold H. Kelley, The Processes of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107
(1973).
18 See, e.g., Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Spontaneous Discounting of Availability in Frequency




the market slump than any of the other less vivid and understandable
explanations.
20
Other cognitive biases may play a role in exacerbating the perception of
fraud during downwards trends and underestimating the risk during upwards
trends. Self-serving bias is the tendency, when evidence as to the cause of an
outcome is ambiguous, to attribute one's actions to positive outcomes and
attribute other causes to negative outcomes. 21 The return on an investment in a
company is an outcome that has ambiguous causes: it is perceived to depend on
skill in picking the right investment (by predicting future events or trends, and
their impact on potential investments), though unpredictable events can also
affect the company. 22 When the investment does well (which is more likely to
occur during upwards market trends), self-serving bias causes a person to
attribute the success of her investment to her skills. But when the investment
does poorly, self-serving bias causes an individual to resist inferring that she
has poor investment skills. Instead, an individual seeks another cause for the
poor performance-preferably one that would not have been reasonably
predictable and therefore does not reflect on the investor's skills. Fraud is an
appealing explanation for the investment's decline because fraud is specifically
prohibited (thus, perhaps, unexpected) and the ability to predict susceptibility to
fraud is less indicative of one's investment skills than the ability to predict, say,
economic trends that impact the company. Since securities offerings are policed
by the government, investors may view government as responsible for
anticipating and preventing fraud.23 Failure to anticipate fraud, therefore, may
reflect badly on the government, but it does not reflect as badly on the
individual's investment skills. 24 Thus, a person affected by self-serving bias is
20 Hillel Einhorn and Robin Hogarth call this form of inference the "replacement" mode of
inference (as opposed to the "disconfirmation" mode, which rejects a causal explanation if faced with
evidence to the contrary, even if no other explanation is better supported by evidence):
The replacement view is consistent with the Kuhman notion that theories in
science are not discarded, despite evidence to the contrary, if they are not replaced
by better alternatives .... Indeed, the replacement view is equally strong in
everyday inference. A useful analogy might be the following: How many people
would read detective stories if the author only revealed who did not do it?
Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 17, at 15 (citing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962)).
21 See Amy H. Mezulis et al., Is There a Universal Positivity Bias in Attributions? A Meta-
Analytic Review of Individual, Developmental, and Cultural Differences in the Self-Servtng Attributional
Bias, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 738 (2004).
22 Michael L. Hartzmark, Luck Versus Forecast Ability: Determinants of Trader Performance
in Futures Market, 64 J. BUS. 49 (1991) (finding support for the "luck hypothesis" through analysis of
futures traders' returns).
23 Jon Klick and Greg Mitchell make a related point in a broader context, claiming that
paternalism reduces incentives of individuals to de-bias themselves and learn from failures. See Jonathan
Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1627-41 (2006).
24 In contrast, government makes no guarantees as to the quality of securities, however, so
failing to predict that interest rates will rise and reduce a company's profitability would be a demerit to
the investor, not government.
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more likely to perceive fraud as the cause for a decline in her investment,
leading to a heightened perception of fraud when markets (and therefore most
investments) decline and to a reduced perception of fraud when markets surge.
Availability bias-the tendency to "assess the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrence can be
brought to mind" 25-also contributes to overestimating the risk of fraud when
markets decline and underestimating the risk when markets rise. Availability
bias causes people who are exposed to a small number of noticeable events to
overestimate the likelihood of such events. For example, several reports of
deaths from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Canada resulted in
Canadians perceiving the probability that they would suffer serious harm or
death from SARS as 7.43% (and perceived an even higher probability-
8.94%-to others of their age and geographic region), while the actual
probability of contracting SARS was 0.0008% (and the probability of dying
from SARS was 0.0002%).26 Similarly, the murder of ten people by snipers in
the Washington, D.C. area during the fall of 2002 caused millions of people to
significantly change their lifestyles to avoid exposure to this risk, a risk that one
scholar estimated to be
smaller than the risk of death from drinking thirty diet sodas with saccharin,
from driving one hundred miles, from smoking two cigarettes, from ten airline
trips, from living in a home with a smoker for two weeks, from living in Denver
rather than Philadelphia for forty days, and from eating thirty-five slices of fresh
bread. 27
How do economic cycles trigger an availability bias? Downturns in the
economic cycle expose existing fraud because, as explained above, investors
see fraud as a probable explanation for the decline in stock price. They view
fraud as more probable and increase efforts to uncover it, thus increasing the
probability that hidden fraud would be detected. Furthermore, during economic
downturns, many companies' cash flows diminish, making some types of fraud
(such as embezzlement) harder to conceal. 28 As a result, downturns increase
29
the probability that an ongoing fraud in a company will be exposed.
25 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974).
26 Neal R. Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: A Cross-National
Comparison, 69 Mo. L. REv. 991, 996-99 (2004).
27 Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 n.13 (2003) ("The risk of living in Denver comes from slightly elevated radiation
levels; the risk from eating fresh bread comes from formaldehyde.").
28 Admittedly, not all types of fraud are concealed by cash flow. Some types of fraud, such as
providing false positive information about a company, may be more likely to occur when the company is
doing poorly than when it is doing well.
29 While the SEC and industry regulators attempt to detect corporate fraud, the role of actors
that lack an explicit mandate to discover fraud, such as the media or employees, is often greater. See I.J.
Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (European Corp. Governance Inst.
Fin., Working Paper No. 156, 2007), available at http://papers ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=959410 (finding that between 1996 and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, only 35%
of corporate fraud cases in the study were discovered by actors with explicit mandates to do so, and
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Economic downturns affect many companies at the same time, so the
likelihood of exposing ongoing fraud in each of them increases at the same
time. The resulting discovery of fraud in several companies in rapid succession
is likely to trigger an availability bias that would cause individuals to
overestimate the prevalence of fraud, just as reports of several deaths from
SARS within a short period of time created a perception of a catastrophic
SARS epidemic.
This misperception is likely to be exacerbated by social amplification-a
tendency to perceive a risk as greater if it concerns others as well. 30 Social
amplification is particularly galvanized by mass media: very few of the readers
of this Article have personally seen a person die from SARS, but nearly all
readers have heard on the news of people dying from SARS. Each individual's
risk perception is affected by the availability of knowledge of SARS's victims,
but the risk perception is further heightened by discovering that others are also
concerned about SARS, even though the concern by others has been triggered
by the same report. Because economic downturns affect many companies at
once, there are large numbers of people who suffer loss of their investments
and are, therefore, concerned about fraud. An individual's concern about fraud
is then amplified by concerns of her colleagues. This exacerbates her
perception of the risk of fraud beyond the risk she would have perceived had
fewer companies suffered a slump, since fewer colleagues would share her
concern about fraud.
Thus far we addressed the impact of an economic downturn on
individuals' perception of fraud. But economic downturns also affect
individuals' incentives to investigate potential instances of corporate fraud and
to attempt to manipulate others' perceptions of fraud. Because the mind tends
to prefer causal explanations that conform with the observed result, 31 it may be
easier to persuade a judge or jury, in the face of declining stock prices, that
fraud (which should reduce stock prices) took place.
Furthermore, if fraud is established, proof of the financial loss that
resulted from the fraud tends to be easier when stock price declined as
compared to when it rose. As discussed earlier, 32 the phenomenon of
discounting causes people to view potential causes to an event as less likely if
another potential cause seems more likely. Thus, if fraud has been established,
from the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley to 2004 these actors accounted for only slightly more than 50%
of the cases).
30 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119, 1130-37 (2002)
(discussing social amplification and the mechanisms that shape it).
31 This is a variation of confirmation bias. See infra note 35. When stock prices rise, people
are less likely to expect events that would cause prices to decline, such as fraud, and are therefore more
likely to discount ambiguous evidence that could indicate fraud.
32 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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judges and juries are more likely to overestimate the portion of the price
decline attributable to the fraud.33
Just as these cognitive biases enhance the perception of fraud when stock
markets decline, they attenuate the perception of fraud when markets rise.
Attribution discounting 34 and confirmation bias 35 make the perception of fraud
in a rising market less likely, because fraud would explain a market decline, not
a market rise. A simple, single-cause explanation for the market rise (e.g.,
favorable market conditions) tends to be more appealing than a more complex
and nuanced assessment in which positive explanations are encumbered-but
not completely offset-by fraud. In addition, self-serving bias in a rising
market favors the adoption of a causal explanation connecting the rising stock
prices to the investor's skill in picking the investment, rather than to fraudulent
optimistic misrepresentations. Overconfidence in one's investing skills may
also make one overestimate her ability to detect potential fraud (and thus
reduce the amount she invests in monitoring for fraud).
As the rising economic tide lifts most ships, more companies are able to
hide fraud (e.g., in cases of embezzlement) and fewer companies need to resort
to fraud (e.g., in cases of over-optimistic misrepresentations aimed to buy the
company time to recover from a downturn). In addition, rising markets reduce
the incentive of even non-biased potential plaintiffs and lawyers to investigate
possible fraud, because of increased uncertainty in proving the occurrence of
fraud and the loss caused by it. Thus, instances of exposed fraud are fewer and
less frequent, reducing availability. When the stock price rises, discounting and
confirmation bias may become hurdles to the plaintiff, causing juries and
judges to underestimate the impact of an alleged event (fraud) that should
reduce stock prices. As a result, litigation that alleges fraud becomes riskier and
more costly for the plaintiff when stock prices rise. This reduces the incentives
for lawyers and plaintiffs to incur expenses in investigating the existence of
fraud, even if they overcame cognitive biases and correctly estimated the risk
33 I am not claiming that the legal standard for assessing the loss is biased. Under Dura
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the mere drop in the pnce of a share following the
exposure of a misrepresentation is insufficient to prove loss causation in a securities fraud action under
SEC Rule 10b-5 because "that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower
price." Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
However, judges and juries are likely to exhibit cognitive biases in determining whether a loss is
attributed to fraud. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001)
(suggesting that judges are susceptible to several cognitive biases). Thus, the unbiased legal standard
may be applied in a manner that is biased in favor of attributing a larger fraud-related loss when stock
markets decline than when they rise.
34 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
35 Confirmation bias is "the tendency to seek out only confirmatory evidence in hypothesis
testing, even when the presence or absence of disconfirming evidence would be more useful." Jeffrey J.




of fraud.36 During such times, corporate fraud less frequently enters public
discourse, resulting in social attenuation of the risk (the inverse of social
amplification)-reducing one's risk perception when the risk seems not to
concern others.
The analysis above suggests that fraud is likely to be overestimated during
and immediately following market slumps, and is likely to be underestimated
during market booms. 37 Such misperceptions affect the amount of effort
investors place in self-policing, 38 the pressure they place on government to
intervene to protect them from fraud, and the degree to which they altogether
avoid investing in venues susceptible to fraud. Government responds to the
public's risk perceptions by enacting and enforcing laws in ways that either
correct the public's misperceptions or exacerbate them and thus either improve
social welfare (by reducing the biases and therefore shifting individuals' self-
policing, political pressure, and risk avoidance closer to the optimal level) or
reduce it (by exacerbating the biases). Part II of this Article will consider when
conspicuous law enforcement 39 improves social welfare and when it does not.
Before engaging in this analysis, the remainder of Part I will examine how anti-
fraud law enforcement is deployed in practice: a cyclical pattern that mimics
the cyclical misperception of the public in perceiving the bias.
B. Cyclical Trends in Anti-Fraud Law Enforcement
Scholars have long observed the cyclical pattern of creating and enforcing
laws regarding corporate fraud: a wave of regulation in response to a stock
36 See, eg., The Lex Column, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at 16 ("Investors cut company
managers more slack when share prices are going up. That partly explains a sharp decline in the number
of US securities class action lawsuits in 2006 compared with 2005. This is not just psychological. If a
company's valuation is rising, its shareholders have no financial loss on which to hang litigation,
whatever managers might be up to.").
37 The analysis above was theoretical: it applied to the context of corporate fraud cognitive
biases that were empirically tested in other contexts. It is difficult to conduct a direct empirical
examination of whether the public misperceives corporate fraud. Even if perceptions could be accurately
measured, the researcher would need to have data on the actual incidence of fraud in order to determine
whether a given perception was correct. However, any data on the actual incidence of fraud is likely to
be tied to enforcement efforts-more reported fraud may be the result of more vigorous law
enforcement rather than an increase in the occurrence of fraud. Since this Article argues that law
enforcement affects risk perception, it cannot use a proxy for actual fraud that is dependent on the
amount of law enforcement
The analysis above is also not universal (i.e., does not apply to every individual, all of the
time): while the cyclical misperceptions of fraud affect public discourse, political responses, and
investors' actions, individuals differ in their susceptibility to cognitive biases See Chris Guthrie &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REv. 2017 (2006)
(suggesting that insurance claim adjusters are less susceptible to some cognitive biases than the general
population); Rachlinski, supra note 35 (discussing evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to
cognitive biases).
38 There would be insufficient self-policing efforts, political pressure and activity avoidance
when the public underestimates the risk. Conversely, there would be excessive self-policing efforts,
political pressure and activity avoidance when they overestimate it.
39 For example, law enforcement that is observed by the public and affects the public's
perceptions.
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market slump, followed by a plateau and a decline in regulation until the
occurrence of the next slump. In his essay What Causes New Securities
Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, Stuart Banner argues that securities
regulation evolved not in response to technological changes, but simply in
response to the fact that the market crashed:
In the past three hundred years, [arguments as to the inefficiency of speculation]
have periodically persuaded governments to regulate the market so as to restrict
trading. Such episodes of regulation have been closely linked to price declines.
If one wants to know what future event would be most likely to persuade
governments that [the view that speculation is inefficient] is right, the answer is
not new developments in information technology. The answer is a crash.
40
Larry Ribstein describes the cycle in greater detail:
A boom encourages unwarranted trust in markets, leading to the speculative
frenzy of a bubble and then to the inevitable bust. The bust, in turn, leads first to
the disclosure of fraud and then to the mirror image of the bubble-a kind of
speculative frenzy in regulation.
4 1
This cyclical pattern seems to apply not only to the enactment of new
laws, but also to the enforcement of existing ones. Consider the graph below.
The solid line represents, as a proxy for the trend in enforcement, the change
(compared to the previous year) in the number of enforcement actions initiated
by the SEC in each of the fiscal years 1995-2006.42 The dashed line represents,
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40 Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 849, 855 (1997).
41 Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REv. 77, 78 (2003).
42 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORTS 1994-2006, http://www.sec.gov/about/
annrep.shtml (containing tables in each report's appendix with enforcement data for the fiscal year). The
U.S. Government fiscal year runs from October 1 to the following year's September 30.
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year preceding the first day of the fiscal year. 43 One can observe a tendency of
the two proxies to move in opposite directions-significant increases in
enforcement actions when the market index declines (or significantly slows its
upward trend), and decreases (or very mild increases) in enforcement actions
when the market index rises significantly. 4
Several scholars have been critical of this cyclical pattern, mostly for two
reasons: (a) its focus on government-mandated solutions to fraud, which
preempt and preclude market-based solutions;45 and (b) the tendency to prefer
46speed (of legislation or enforcement) to substance. Roberta Romano cautions:
[L]egislating in the immediate aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a
formula for poor public policymaking (at least in the context of financial market
regulation). The high salience of events forestalls a careful and balanced
consideration of the issues, providing a window for action by the better-
positioned, not the better-informed, policy entrepreneurs. This is a particular
concern because legislation drafted in a perceived state of emergency can be
difficult to undo.
47
This cyclical view of anti-fraud law creation and enforcement is held not
only by scholars who advocate less mandatory government regulation of fraud,
but also by some who call for more such regulation. Erik Gerding also
describes the cyclical pattern of increased enforcement following busts and
reduced enforcement during booms,48 but focuses on the empty half of the
regulation glass. Disagreeing with Romano's observation that "bubble laws"
43 For example, the figure for fiscal year 2005, which begins on Oct. 1 2004, would be the
change in the S&P 500 index between Oct 1, 2003 and Oct. 1, 2004. This figure indicates the stock
market trend observed by regulators at the beginning of the fiscal year, and therefore affecting the
enforcement efforts in the year that follows. S&P 500 index data was drawn from
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC.
44 This data suggests that the law enforcement shares with law creation the cyclical pattern
discussed in the literature. It is not a rigorous empirical analysis of the correlation between market
indexes and enforcement actions. Such an examination is outside the scope of this Article.
45 Ribstein, supra note 41 ("Regulators are more likely to react to past market mistakes than
to prevent future mistakes. Even worse, post-bust regulators are likely to ignore the benefits of market
flexibility and, therefore, to impede the nsk-taking and innovation that will bring the next boom.");
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) ("The specific policy implication drawn from this Article's analysis of the
scholarly literature and political dynamics is that the mandates should be rescinded, either by
transforming them into statutory defaults that apply to firms at their option or by removing them
completely and redirecting jurisdictional authority to the states.").
46 Romano, supra note 45, at 1525-26 ("[l]t was widely perceived in the media that members
of Congress were motivated by reelection concerns when a statute was hurriedly enacted in the summer
prior to the midterm elections, after months of languishing in committee, following heightened attention
on corporate malfeasance as the WorldCom scandal erupted post-Enron. The suggestion from the media
was that the prionty of members of Congress was to enact something, with the specific content of less
concern and importance."). See also Lynnley Browning, U.S Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2006, at Cl (describing a backlash against aggressive prosecutorial tactics by the
Department of Justice); Greg Bums, Backlash Against Hardball Tactics, CHI. TRIB, Jan. 14, 2007, at 5-1
(descnbing a backlash against aggressive prosecutorial tactics by appellate judges).
47 Romano, supra note 45, at 1602.
48 Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 CoNN. L. REv. 393 (2006).
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(as Ribstein calls them) 49 are difficult to undo, Gerding claims that during
market booms the funding of enforcement agencies does not increase in
proportion to the increase in market activity, resulting in the enforcement
agency being overwhelmed and ineffective. 50 Thus, while Ribstein, Romano,
and others focus on the increase in legislation and enforcement following busts,
Gerding points out the de facto decrease in enforcement (though, typically,
without formal repeal of the legislation) during booms.
C. Explaining the Cyclical Trends: Bias Arbitrage by Law Enforcement
What causes politicians to enact new legislation and enforce laws more
vigorously (or, at least, more conspicuously) following a market crash?
Romano suggests that politicians are motivated by reelection concerns, and
thus prefer a fast response to a good response.
5 1
This argument has appeal, but it also has a troubling flaw: if the law is
ineffective (or harmful), wouldn't the law's failure be exposed after some time?
At first blush, this is not a problem for the politician as long as the law's failure
is exposed after elections are held. After all, while a statesman thinks of the
next generation, a politician thinks of the next election.
52
But closer examination suggests that a politician's incentives depend on
the election terms. For example, assume that a cynical, purely self-interested
politician is six months away from elections and is considering sponsoring a
bill that will boost her popularity so that she wins the coming elections, yet she
suspects that the law she is enacting will ultimately fail to solve the problem it
addresses. Also assume that this failure will only be apparent a year after the
law's enactment (i.e., after the elections), and this failure will remain salient for
two years (until this issue fades from the memory of the public and is replaced
by other concerns). If this politician is a U.S. Senator, hoping to be reelected
for a six year term, then she would have an incentive to sponsor the law. If she
does not, she may lose the election and stay out of office for six years. If she
does sponsor the law, she will be elected and will endure the embarrassment of
association with a policy failure for two years. After that time, the debacle will
be forgotten, and neither the latter half of her term nor her next bid for
reelection will be affected by the law's failure.
Now consider, under the same assumptions, if the politician is not a
Senator but a Congresswoman, elected for a two-year term. If she sponsors the
bill, she will be elected for office, but then spend her entire term (and her next
bid for reelection) under the shadow of the law's failure. If she declines to
49 Ribstem, supra note 41.
50 Gerding, supra note 48, at 432-37.
51 See Romano, supra note 45.
52 1 am paraphrasing a quote attributed to James Freeman Clarke: "A politician, for example,
is a man who thinks of the next election; while the statesman thinks of the next generation." J.F. Clarke,
Wanted, A Statesman!, in 2 OLD & NEW 644 (1870).
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sponsor the bill, and makes public her reservations to it, she may lose the next
bid for re-elections against a rival who sponsors or supports the bill, but as the
bill's (now the law's) failure becomes apparent, her consistent position against
it should reap electoral rewards in the next elections, while her rival will be
tainted by the law's failure. Thus, a self-interested but far-sighted
Congresswoman would prefer, under our assumptions, not to support the bill
despite its short-term benefits in the impending elections.
Ribstein hints at another explanation for the surge in anti-fraud legislation
following a market crash, by describing this surge as a "speculative frenzy in
regulation" that is the mirror image of the market bubble that preceded it. 53 Are
the politicians who enact the laws simply swept by the same panic that ails the
public? Politicians, like all people, are susceptible to cognitive biases. It is quite
possible that some such biases, such as the illusion of control,54 would affect
politicians more severely than their constituents when assessing the likely
effect of anti-fraud legislation because the politician has more control over
enacting the law and overseeing its enforcement than does the constituent.
But this explanation suffers from the same flaw as the previous one. Not
all people are equally susceptible to cognitive biases; 55 therefore, some
politicians will have risk perceptions that are more accurate than their biased
constituents. These politicians now face the choice of the Congresswoman in
our earlier example: they could cater to biased perceptions, knowing that the
ineffectiveness of the law they sponsored will eventually be exposed, possibly
hindering them in their next bids for reelection, or they could take an unbiased
stance that would harm their short-term prospects but may give them credibility
in the long term. Having the option to choose between these alternatives is of
value to a politician, because sometimes taking the unbiased position would be
in the politician's interest. Because only the bias-resistant politicians 56 possess
this advantage (their biased brethren do not see the feasibility of taking the
unbiased position and so cannot pursue this course of action in circumstances in
which it would be wise to do so), one expects that through an evolutionary
process more surviving politicians will possess these traits and resist biases that
relate to the perception of risks in the areas in which they are publicly
prominent (e.g., resistance to misperceptions regarding the risk of war in the
case of politicians who regularly weigh in on matters of defense or foreign
policy).
53 Ribstein, supra note 41, at 78.
54 The illusion of control, which is closely related to optimism bias, is a pattern of over-
optimism regarding events the outcome of which depends partially on the individual's skill and partially
on other circumstances. See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 311 (1975).
55 See Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 37; Rachlinski, supra note 35.
56 By "bias-resistant politicians" I refer to a resistance to the particular biases that relate to the
risk perception of the subject of contemplated legislation (e.g., the perception of fraud during an
economic slump). The same politicians may be susceptible to other biases, but their resistance to this
particular bias provides them with a competitive advantage as politicians dunng economic slumps.
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Any plausible explanation for the sustainability of the cyclical pattern of
legislation and law enforcement must address the ability of politicians to retain
their credibility in the long term. I argue that politicians maintain their
credibility because they address risks that are misperceived to be greater than
they are.
For example, suppose that the probability of insiders committing fraud in
a given company is 0.001% (1-in-100,000), but due to cognitive biases of the
type discussed above, 57 the public perceives the probability to be 1%. An
Attorney General ("AG") launches a series of investigations into companies'
behavior, followed by much publicized criminal charges and arrests. The AG
claims that this initiative will deter potential perpetrators, so that the probability
of fraud will decline by 99%. Assume that the initiative, in fact, does not affect
the objective probability of fraud at all.58
Since prior to the law enforcement initiative the public perceived the
probability of fraud to be 1%, the AG's promise of a 99% reduction translates
into a probability of 0.01%. While some individuals may be skeptical of the
AG's claims, they witness with time that the frequency of fraud is closer to the
AG's claim of 0.01% than to their previous perception of 1% (the actual
frequency that they are witnessing is, of course, the objective probability-
0.001%). This lends credibility to the AG's claims that his actions reduced the
fraud. Thus, despite the fact that the AG presented his (objectively ineffective)
law enforcement initiative as a stunning success (claiming a 99% reduction in
the probability of fraud), his claim would gain credibility over time, rather than
lose it. The key to the AG's success was the choice of the risk his law
enforcement initiative addressed: a risk that was vastly overestimated by the
public. The greater the gap between the perceived risk and the actual risk (the
"perception gap"),59 the more credit the AG can claim for his initiative, without
losing credibility and without requiring the initiative to have greater objective
effects.
57 See supra Section I.A.
58 It may seem implausible that a law enforcement initiative would have no effect at all on the
objective probability of fraud. This assumption is not very important for the hypothetical's purposes.
Given the large difference between the perceived and actual risks in our example, changing that
assumption to increase the initiative's effect on actual risk would not make a significant difference on
the public's perception gap (the difference between the perceived and actual probabilities of fraud).
Before the initiative, the perception gap had been 0.999% (1%-0.001%). After the initiative, the
perception gap is 0.009% (0.01%-0.001%), a reduction of about 99.1% in the perception gap. If, at the
other extreme of possible objective effects, the initiative magically eliminated the objective threat (by
forever detemng all people who would commit fraud) the perception gap would be 0.0 1% (0.0 1%-0%),
a reduction of about 99% in the perception gap.
59 Donald Langevoort discussed a concept similar to the perception gap, which he called the
"expectations gap." See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139 (2003). His analysis
examined how the SEC's behavior and funding reduces or increases the expectations gap. This Article




The same analysis would apply to legislators taking credit for new
legislation they sponsor. It is this analysis that ties together the two cyclical
patterns discussed above: the cyclical pattern of the public's misperception of
fraud and the cyclical pattern of the government's enforcement of existing anti-
fraud laws and creation of new laws. As discussed above, the public is likely to
underestimate the risk of fraud during a stock market surge and overestimate it
during a downturn. Therefore, during downturns the risk of fraud becomes an
attractive issue for politicians to address. Because at these times the public's
perception of the risk of fraud exceeds the actual risk, politicians are unlikely to
lose credibility by "overselling" the effectiveness of initiatives (enacting new
laws or conspicuously enforcing existing laws) that purport to reduce fraud.
The main constraint they face is not the objective success of their initiative, but
competition with each other over credit for the illusory reduction of the risk.6 °
During stock market upturns, the situation reverses. The public may
underestimate the risk of fraud. This reduces the credit a politician can claim
for her initiative. For example, suppose that during an upturn the actual risk of
fraud is 0.1%, but the public perceives the probability as 0.01%. If the AG
launched a law enforcement initiative that reduced the probability of fraud by
an impressive 90%, he would reduce the actual risk to 0.0 1%--exactly the risk
perceived by the public before the initiative began. If the AG honestly claimed
his initiative reduced fraud by 90%, the public would expect the probability to
now be 0.001 0/o-a tenth of the actual probability. Over time, the public will
see that the frequency of fraud is closer to the probability they perceived prior
to the AG's initiative, causing the politician's claims of the initiative's success
to lose credibility. In fact, under the assumptions of our hypothetical, if the AG
claimed his initiative had any effect at all on reducing fraud, he would lose
credibility over time-despite the fact that his initiative is highly successful in
fighting fraud.
Actual perception gaps may be less striking than the ones used in the
above examples, but the lessons leamed from these examples are true for any
perception gap: when the perception gap is positive (perceived risk exceeds
actual risk) a politician can credibly claim more credit for her initiative than its
actual effects warrant; and when the perception gap is negative (actual risk
exceeds perceived risk) a politician loses credibility unless she "undersells" her
initiatives and claims less credit than the initiative's actual effects warrant. This
makes the risk of fraud an attractive issue to address when it is overestimated
by the public (i.e., during downturns) and an unattractive issue to address when
it is underestimated by the public (i.e., during upturns). This is precisely the
cyclical pattem of enforcement that has been observed.6 1
The strategy I described above consists of identifying perception gaps and
taking actions (such as conspicuous law enforcement) that close the gap while
60 See Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 821-24.
61 See supra Section I.B.
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creating private benefits for the person undertaking the actions. This is a form
of arbitrage that I call bias arbitrage. 62 Compare it to traditional arbitrage, such
as in commodities: an arbitrageur identifies a gap between the price of gold in
London and its lower price in New York. She buys gold in New York and sells
it in London, profiting from the price difference. At the same time, her
purchases of gold in New York (and those of other arbitrageurs) raise the price
of gold there, while her sales in London (and others') lower the price in
London, until the price gap is eliminated and the potential for profit dissipates.
Despite the hostility with which they are treated following market busts,
63
stock and commodity arbitrageurs (often known as "speculators") are seen by
economists as enhancing social welfare by mitigating price gaps, making
markets more efficient. 64 Bias arbitrageurs have analogous effects on social
welfare when they reduce perception gaps. When optimal (i.e., welfare
maximizing) law enforcement policies are devised, these effects should be
considered. I will address the social welfare effects of bias arbitrage, and the
resulting effect on optimal anti-fraud law enforcement policies, in the next Part
of this Article.
II. Optimal Anti-Fraud Law Enforcement Policies
A. Conspicuous Law Enforcement and Social Welfare
When facing a risk, individuals have the choice of confronting it, inducing
someone else (such as government) to confront it, or avoiding activities that
expose the individuals to the risk (or a combination of the three responses). In
the case of the risk of corporate fraud, individuals may expend resources self-
65policing against fraud, influence government to intervene through increased
public law enforcement or the creation of new and more effective laws,6 6 or
avoid investment in financial instruments that would be vulnerable to corporate
fraud.
62 See Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, supra note 5.
63 See Banner, supra note 40; Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 739 (1999) (summarizing the
"unflattenng perceptions of speculators").
64 Stout, supra note 63, at 737-38 (describing how speculators, under the "information
arbitrage" model, "promote[] allocative efficiency").
65 Self-policing does not necessarily mean that the shareholders directly monitor the
management themselves, but rather that shareholders take action to mitigate the risk rather than avoiding
it or letting government mitigate it. For example, they can create or expand a bureaucracy that monitors
management (such as an audit committee or a supervisory board), or they can challenge corporate
actions that have a business justification but also make the commission of fraud easier or its detection
more difficult.
66 Most individuals do not have significant direct influence on politicians, but may passively
influence politicians by creating a demand for policies that address risks they are concerned about, and
voting for politicians who champion such policies. Politicians, sensing this demand by their constituents,
will respond by adopting policies addressing (or at least purporting to address) the relevant risks.
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Each of these responses has costs, but each also has benefits in the form of
reduced vulnerability to harm from fraud. Each response is scalable, rather than
binary: one can invest more or invest less in self-policing, political pressure,
and in the stock market. An individual balances the mix of responses based on
the relative cost and effectiveness of each, spending the marginal dollar (or
equivalent sacrifice of utility) on whichever response (self-policing, influencing
others, or avoidance) has the greatest marginal effect on reducing the risk.
The magnitude of an individual's response to a risk depends on the
individual's perception of the risk. She will incrementally increase each
response at her disposal until the marginal cost of the response equals the
marginal reduction in the harm the individual perceives from the risk.
While an individual's response to a risk depends on the perceived risk, the
optimal response to a risk depends on the actual risk and is the equilibrium
point at which the marginal cost of the most efficient response not yet
undertaken is equal to the marginal reduction this response causes to the harm
from the risk. An individual will respond optimally if she correctly perceives
the risk (i.e., her perceived risk is identical to the actual risk)-in other words,
when her perception gap is zero. Responses become less efficient as the
perception gap grows in either direction. An increase in a perception gap that is
positive (i.e., the perceived risk is higher than the actual risk) means that
responses are costlier than the harm from the risk they mitigate; an increase in a
perception gap that is negative (i.e., the perceived risk is lower than the actual
risk) means that the individual foregoes cost-effective responses.
Any effect conspicuous law enforcement has on individuals' risk
perception will affect social welfare in a manner that is independent of the
effect that law enforcement has on social welfare through the manipulation of
incentives (e.g., deterring fraud by increasing law enforcement efforts and thus
increasing the probability of being caught and punished).67 If law enforcement
reduces the perception gap, this effect will increase social welfare regardless of
law enforcement's impact on the actual risk. An example of such a situation is
the hypothetical presented earlier in this Article of an AG's law enforcement
initiative that reduces the perceived risk of fraud by 99%, when this risk was
previously overestimated by a factor of 100.68 As calculated above, 69 under the
assumptions of the hypothetical, the perception gap was reduced by 99.1%.
Conversely, if law enforcement's effect on risk perception causes the
perception gap to grow (e.g., by increasing risk perception when the perception
gap is already positive or by reducing risk perception when the perception gap
67 Conspicuous law enforcement will not always affect individuals' risk perception. Because
of the confirmation bias described in note 35 above, individuals may interpret ambiguity in the message
conveyed by law enforcement as supporting their current risk perception. However, confirmation bias is
neither ubiquitous nor absolute, so that conspicuous law enforcement is likely to affect risk perception in
many cases.
68 See supra Section I.C.
69 See supra note 58.
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is already negative), this effect will reduce social welfare. To illustrate a
situation in which increased law enforcement increases the perception gap,
modify the original hypothetical so that (perhaps during a stock market
upswing), the public underestimates the risk of fraud (rather than overestimates
it, as was in the original hypothetical): the actual risk is 0.01%, but the public
perceives the risk to be half of that (0.005%). The AG launches another
enforcement initiative, and persuades the public that his enforcement initiative
will further reduce the risk of fraud by 99% (the public may be initially
amenable to that notion having witnessed the AG's apparent success in the
original hypothetical). Under these assumptions, the enforcement initiative will
increase the perception gap (perceived risk - actual risk) by 99%.70
Thus, law enforcement increases social welfare when it reduces the
perception gap, such as when the perception gap is positive and law
enforcement reduces risk perception. Law enforcement reduces social welfare
when it increases the perception gap, such as when the perception gap is
negative and enforcement reduces risk perception.
B. The Effect of Conspicuous Law Enforcement on Risk Perception
The analysis thus far has assumed that law enforcement reduces
individuals' risk perception (or, if perceived ineffective, does not change the
risk perception). In the remainder of this Article, I will relax this assumption.
While it may seem intuitive that law enforcement would reduce the
perception of the risk it purports to address, it may under some circumstances
actually increase risk perception. Conspicuous law enforcement bundles two
separate-and opposite-messages. One message is that an event related to the
risk has occurred (e.g., a business executive has (allegedly) committed fraud).
The other message is that the event and the underlying risk are being addressed
by government through the enforcement of the law (e.g., charges have been
filed against the executive). If, in a particular instance of conspicuous law
enforcement, the former message resonates more than the latter, then
conspicuous law enforcement increases risk perception. Conversely, if the latter
70 Prior to the enforcement initiative, the perception gap was -0.005% (0.005%-0.01%), and
after the initiative the perception gap was -0.00995% (0.00005%-0.01%).
71 As an exception to this rule, reduction tn the perception gap may not increase social
welfare if another bias affects exposure to the risk. For example, an investor may overestimate the
prevalence of fraud, but also overestimate her ability to identify companies that are "safe" from fraud. If
her risk perception regarding the prevalence of fraud is corrected without affecting her perception
regarding her ability to identify "safe" companies, the effect on social welfare will be negative. This
exception is a result of too narrow a definition of the risk in which a perception gap exists. The risk of
the investor being harmed from fraud was separated to two separate risks: the prevalence of fraud in the
market, and the probability that the investor will identify and avoid fraudulent companies. In the
example above, only the former risk was corrected. If the risk in which the perception gap occurred is




message resonates more than the former, then conspicuous law enforcement
reduces risk perception.
Consider a non-legal context in which I experienced a similar bundle of
messages: while tending to my lawn, I unexpectedly discovered shards of glass
in it and immediately disposed of them. After this experience, do I feel more or
less secure walking barefoot on the lawn? On one hand, I received a salient
reminder of the risk involved; on the other hand, I addressed this risk, so
objectively the amount of glass shards in my lawn has diminished, and with it
the likelihood of injury.
Similarly, observing a number of executives in Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
and other companies charged with corporate crimes may cause me to perceive
corporate crime to be much more prevalent than I thought before, or to perceive
the government to be actively pursuing corporate criminals, making such crime
less threatening.
Which of the two messages-the risk or the remedy-prevails in a given
case of conspicuous law enforcement is a matter of great importance to the
determination of optimal enforcement policy, as I will discuss in the next
Section. Given its importance, it is surprising that this question has not received
the attention of scholars. The goal of this Article is to highlight the importance
of this research question and to develop the implications of the answer to this
question for optimal law enforcement policy. Identifying the underlying
issue-when conspicuous law enforcement increases risk perception and when
it reduces it-requires separate and extensive research (both theoretical and
empirical) that is beyond the scope of this Article.
I will therefore continue the analysis in this Article by examining each
alternative effect on risk perception separately and assessing its effect on
optimal law enforcement policy. The extant literature on optimal enforcement
policy views enforcement as a trade-off between enforcement costs and
deterrent effects (i.e., the manipulation of potential perpetrators' incentives). It
does not consider an additional important feature of law enforcement that
affects social welfare-its manipulation of the risk perception of the general
(non-perpetrator) population. In the remainder of this Section of the Article, I
will address this hitherto ignored third effect of law enforcement. As explained
below, taking into account law enforcement's effect on risk perception may
significantly shape optimal law enforcement policy. When addressing risk
perceptions that fluctuate cyclically, due consideration of perception effects
may require the adoption of an uncommon policy: counter-cyclical
enforcement of the law.
C. Optimal Enforcement When Enforcement Reduces Perceived Risk
When conspicuous law enforcement reduces most individuals' perceived
risk, conspicuous law enforcement will usually reduce positive perception gaps
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(increasing social welfare) and increase negative perception gaps (reducing
social welfare).
I qualify the first statement (that reducing perceived risk will reduce
positive perception gaps) because it is possible, though uncommon, for a
reduction in risk perception to increase a perception gap that was previously
positive, if the magnitude of the risk reduction is greater than twice the
magnitude of the pre-existing perception gap (in absolute value terms)-a
situation that can be called "overshooting." For example, suppose that prior to
the conspicuous law enforcement, the objective probability of a risk was 2.5%
and the perceived probability of the risk was 3%, so the perception gap was
0.5% (3%-2.5%). Assume also that the conspicuous law enforcement reduced
the perceived risk by half, to 1.5%, causing the perception gap to become -1%
(1.5%-2.5%). The absolute value of the perception gap (and thus the magnitude
of the distortion caused by the misperception) has increased from 0.5% to 1%,
thus reducing social welfare. The reason was that the reduction in perceived
risk was so great that it "overshot" the pre-existing perception gap, creating the
opposite misperception (underestimation of the risk, rather than the prior
overestimation of the risk) at a greater magnitude that it was before.
As I argued above, such situations are likely uncommon because the
incentives for bias arbitrage decline as the perception gap narrows and become
negative when the arbitrageur's actions (e.g., conspicuous law enforcement)
increases the perception gap: the AG is seen to address a risk that the public
(over-optimistically) views as not severe and thus does not even receive full
72
credit for the objective effects of enforcement on the risk. Therefore, the AG
is likely to stop the law enforcement initiative before the perception gap
reverses and to seek more fertile ground for law enforcement (in the form of
other risks that have a large positive perception gap).
When describing bias arbitrage in the previous Section,73 I explained why
AGs (broadly defined to include all individuals who control the enforcement of
law) have an incentive to enforce law conspicuously (and thus engage in bias
arbitrage) when there is a large positive perception gap (i.e., people
significantly overestimate the risk) and refrain from conspicuous enforcement
of a risk that has a negative perception gap (i.e., people underestimate the risk).
If law enforcement reduces the perceived risk, then the AG's incentives are
aligned with the correct policy. When there is a positive perception gap
(perceived risk > actual risk), conspicuous law enforcement reduces the
perceived risk and therefore the perception gap. When there is a negative
perception gap (perceived risk < actual risk), conspicuous law enforcement
would exacerbate it by further reducing the perceived risk. In the latter case, it
72 For example, if the actual risk of fraud is 1% but the public believes the risk is only 0.5%,
the AG would receive no credit for a law enforcement initiative that reduced the actual risk by half, to
0.5%, because the public already perceived the risk to be that low.
73 See supra Section I.C.
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is good that the AG does not have an incentive to engage in conspicuous law
enforcement.
This does not mean that conspicuous law enforcement is always a good
thing when there is a positive perception gap (and when enforcement reduces
risk perception)- law enforcement has costs (expenses of the prosecutors and
the judicial system, costs borne by private parties in order to comply with the
law as enforced, costs of error, etc.). These costs may outweigh both the
benefits of deterring wrongdoing and the benefits of reducing the public's
perception gap.
Nonetheless, law enforcement's benefits from reducing perception gaps
are a significant part of the cost-benefit calculus and may tip the scales in favor
of law enforcement that, absent these benefits, would not be cost-effective.
Importantly, when law enforcement reduces the perceived risk, the incentives
of those who control law enforcement are aligned with those of the public in
choosing a level of law enforcement that optimizes effects on risk perception.
D. Optimal Enforcement When Enforcement Increases Perceived Risk
How does optimal enforcement policy change when conspicuous law
enforcement increases, rather than reduces, perceived risk? Unsurprisingly, the
effects are the inverse of those described in the previous Section. Social welfare
is increased by conspicuous law enforcement (by reducing the perception gap)
if the perception gap was previously negative. In other words, if people
underestimated the risk, and conspicuous law enforcement increases their risk
perception, it will usually cause them to perceive the risk more accurately.
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Conversely, conspicuous law enforcement would reduce social welfare
(by increasing the perception gap) if previously the perception gap was positive
(or there was no perception gap). Put differently, if people overestimated the
risk even before the conspicuous law enforcement, and that enforcement
initiative further increased their risk perception, then following the initiative
they will perceive the risk less accurately than before.
Applied to the context of corporate fraud discussed in Part I of this
Article, if enforcement increases risk perception, then anti-fraud enforcement
efforts should increase during stock market upswings, in order to curb cognitive
biases that cause the public to underestimate the risk of fraud; and anti-fraud
enforcement efforts should be reduced during stock market slumps, to avoid
exacerbating the public's already excessive perception of the risk of fraud.
Unfortunately, the incentives of the AGs are diametrically opposed. As
explained in Section I.C, they benefit from increasing conspicuous law
enforcement when there is a positive perception gap (i.e., people overestimate
74 Again this conclusion is qualified because of the possibility of "overshooting," explained in
Section II.C. As explained above, AGs have incentives to avoid "overshooting," making such
occurrences uncommon.
Yale Journal on Regulation
the risk of fraud), and they have a disincentive to address the risk of fraud when
there is a negative perception gap (i.e., people underestimate the risk).
As I mentioned in Section II.A, one response to an increase in the
perceived risk is efforts to influence others-particularly government-to take
actions to reduce the risk. Such influence may involve active lobbying, or
passively voting for politicians who emphasize their commitment to address the
risk. Both actively and passively, an increase in risk perception and in this
response to it will boost politicians' incentives to increase conspicuous law
enforcement and thus engage in bias arbitrage.
However, when conspicuous law enforcement increases risk perception,
this response to risk leads to a vicious cycle: a positive perception gap
(overestimation of the risk) leads to excessive pressure by individuals that
government address the risk of fraud. Entrepreneurial prosecutors respond with
conspicuous law enforcement. The barrage of enforcement further increases the
public's perceived risk, and the public therefore further increases its pressure
on government to do more against the seemingly growing risk. Entrepreneurial
prosecutors respond with more conspicuous law enforcement, which increases
yet again the perceived risk, and with it the pressure on government to do
75
more.
This vicious cycle is not a perpetuum mobile,7 6 of course. Eventually the
cycle will break by a change in some of the conditions creating it. For example,
the stock market's downward trend will reverse, causing a gradual reversal in
the perceived risk of fraud, which would reduce pressure on (and incentives
for) prosecutors to engage in conspicuous law enforcement. While this vicious
cycle persists, however, social welfare continues to decline as individuals
excessively self-police, induce government to address the risk, and altogether
avoid activities that expose them to the risk. A counter-cyclical enforcement
policy that increases conspicuous enforcement during market upswings and
reduces conspicuous enforcement during market downturns will avoid this loss
to social welfare. But, for the reasons described above, such a policy is contrary
to prosecutors' incentives and is therefore unlikely to be implemented, unless
the prosecutors operate in an institution that is insulated from the incentives
that induce them to enforce cyclically.
75 As with other cognitive biases, the public is unlikely to realize the cause of the bias. In
other words, individuals are unlikely to recognize that it is the conspicuous law enforcement that makes
them perceive the risk to have increased. Therefore, the public does not punish the prosecutors for the
conspicuous law enforcement, but rather urges them to do so in the hope that the law enforcement will
reduce the risk. Increased perception of risk is likely to be seen to happen despite-rather than
because-of the AG's efforts. If the perception of increased risk persists, however, the public may
eventually determine that the AG has "failed " Therefore, bias arbitrage is less attractive to the AG when
law enforcement increases risk perception than when it reduces risk perception. But even when law
enforcement increases risk perception, bias arbitrage may be more attractive than addressing other risks
that have no perception gaps (or negative perception gaps).
76 Latin for "perpetual motion," this term refers to a condition in which an object continues to




In the final Part of this Article, I will examine what structural designs can
create this insulation and induce prosecutors to enforce counter-cyclically when
such a policy is socially optimal.
Il. Overcoming Impediments to Counter-Cyclical Enforcement
A. Lessons from (Counter-Cyclical) Monetary Policy
Counter-cyclical government policies exist in a multitude of areas, such as
monetary policy, 77 fiscal policy,78 banking regulation, employment in the
public sector, 79 and tax policy regarding private "stabilization funds."
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For example, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy requires that a government
maintain a budget surplus ("saving" some of its revenue) during years in which
its revenues are high and use these funds to cover budget deficits during years
in which its revenues are low. If successful, such a policy would allow the
government to maintain a steady level of expenditure despite volatility in its
revenues. This is particularly important to governments whose revenues are
undiversified and cyclical, such as revenues from the sale of commodities. An
illustration of such a policy is the Iranian government's Oil Stabilization Fund,
77 The counter-cyclical policy in this context involves restricting the money supply (e.g., by
raising interest rates) when the economy is expanding rapidly and expanding the money supply (e.g., by
reducing interest rates) when the economy is contracting. See, e.g., PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY
POLICY: GOALS, INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS (2001).
78 The counter-cyclical policy in this context is restricting spending (i.e., creating a budget
surplus) when government revenues are high, and expanding spending (i.e., creating a budget deficit)
when government revenues are low. See, e g., Richard Lapper & Benedict Mander, Chile Refuses to Be
Swayed by Volatility in Price of Copper, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 4 (describing a counter-cyclical
policy Chile's finance minister created in 2000, under which the government is forced to create a budget
surplus when copper prices are high, and is allowed to spend at a deficit tied to copper prices when they
are low); Gareth Smyth, Iranian President Under Budget Pressure, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at 8
(describing Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund, in which the government must place all revenues from oil
above a certain price, and which the government uses to fund budget deficits when oil prices are low);
see also Bradley M. Braun & Yasuji Otsuka, Case Study: Designing State Contingency Funds as a
Markov Process, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 277, 277 (1993) ("[B]oth politicians and
economists have been exploring options for dealing with inflexible budget rules. The most popular
solution has been the contingency fund [or rainy day fund], which prescribes that monies be set aside
during a good economic period to be made available in the future when adverse economic conditions
occur.")
79 The counter-cyclical policy in this context (which is closely tied to, and is often an
implementation of, counter-cyclical fiscal policy) involves increasing employment in the public sector
when the economy is contracting and reducing employment in the public sector when the economy is
expanding. See, e.g., Bertil Holmlund, Central Wage Setting, Wage Drift and Stabilization Policies
Under Trade Unionism, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 243, 257 (1986).
80 The counter-cyclical policy in this context involves the government permitting private
firms to deduct from their taxable income a certain amount which is kept as a "stabilization fund," to be
used by the firm during recession. In this case, government is subsidizing through a tax break counter-
cyclical policies implemented by private firms. See, e g., John B. Taylor, The Swedish Investment Funds
System as a Stabilization Policy Rule, 1982 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 57 (describing
Swedish tax policy dunng the 1950s and 1960s, which gave tax benefits to firms that placed some of
their profits in a stabilization fund, which the firms were allowed to use during periods of recession).
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into which the government allocates oil revenues in excess of a certain oil price
threshold (presumably, oil revenues below that threshold are included in the
regular budget). 8 1 This fund is then intended to be used for long-term
infrastructure projects and to cover budget deficits in years in which oil prices
drop below the threshold price.
8 2
To be effective, counter-cyclical policies require discipline at all stages of
the cycle. However, the actions they require are usually unpopular at least at
one point in the cycle. In the case of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, it is difficult
for the government to curtail its spending when revenues are high and it has the
means to spend. As it becomes obvious that funds are available, pressure
mounts to make use of the money and reap short-term benefits. Indeed, in the
Iranian Stabilization Fund example, there are reports that the government
diverted money from the fund to the general budget while oil prices were
high, 3 and increased the threshold oil price so that more oil revenue was
diverted to the budget and away from the fund. 84
Counter-cyclical fiscal policies are prone to such failure because they tend
to be administered by politicians who are susceptible to short-term political
pressures. Some counter-cyclical policies have demonstrated greater discipline,
such as monetary policy implemented by central banks.
Monetary policy involves the manipulation of the supply of money to
affect the level of economic activity. 85 Central banks have various tools that
allow them to affect (raise or lower) interest rates, and through them the supply
of money. 86 Excessively restricting the money supply hinders economic
activity, while excessively increasing the money supply causes inflation. To
execute its role in maintaining price stability, the central bank needs to act
counter-cyclically: increase interest rates to constrain the money supply when it
becomes excessive (which occurs when an economy is rapidly expanding and
"overheating") and reduce interest rates to expand the money supply when it is
insufficient (which occurs when the economy experiences a contraction). As
one central banker illustrated, the job of the Federal Reserve Bank is to "take
away the punch bowl just when the party gets going."
87
Just as restraint from spending is the Achilles' Heel of counter-cyclical
fiscal policies, so it is with the decision to reduce the money supply (i.e.,
81 See Smyth, supra note 78.
82 Bill Spindle, Behind Rise of Iran's President: A Populist Economic Agenda, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 2006, at Al.
83 See id.
84 Smyth, supra note 78.
85 The following is a very simplified explanation of monetary policy and the central bank's
role in determining and implementing it. For a more detailed discussion see BOFINGER, supra note 77.
86 For more on the tools used by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to implement monetary
policy, see Cheryl L. Edwards, Open Market Operations in the 1990s, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 859 (1997).
87 This quote is attributed to William McChesney Martin, who was Chairman of the Board of
Govemors of the Federal Reserve between 1951 and 1970. See 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2002).
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raising interest rates is likely to be an unpopular action in the short term).
Raising interest rates increases the cost of capital for businesses, reducing their
profits, and making some previously profitable activities unprofitable. Investors
suffer as both stock and bond prices decline. The gains from raising interest
rates are in the long term, and are often invisible-the avoidance of an
inflationary cycle that would have occurred if the money supply was left
unchecked. Yet in recent years, central banks in many countries have done an
adequate and perhaps even admirable job of resisting political pressures and
executing unpopular policies that maintained inflation at low levels. 88 What
features endow central banks with the institutional backbone to resist political
pressures and maintain the course of a counter-cyclical policy?
The literature on central bank independence identifies three elements that
insulate central banks from political pressure: 89 (a) Goal independence-the
freedom of the bank to determine the balance between price stability,
unemployment and growth in setting its objectives; (b) Instrument
independence-the ability to execute its policies without interference (which
requires limiting or delegating to the central bank those governmental powers
that can thwart the central bank's actions-such as control of short-term
interest rates, control of exchange rates, or restrictions on central bank credits
to the government); (c) Personal independence-reducing political actors'
power over the appointment and removal of members of the central bank
governing body.
In the following Section I will consider how these elements may be
adapted to counter-cyclical anti-fraud enforcement.
B. Institutional Designs that Facilitate Optimal Enforcement
Implementing each of the three elements of independence mentioned
above in the context of anti-fraud law enforcement faces significant challenges.
1. Goal Independence
Central banks must balance between price stability (i.e., prevention of
inflation), unemployment, and growth. In the long term, there is no trade-off
between these factors. As Nobel Prize laureates Milton Friedman and Edmund
88 Even now, central banks are not entirely free of political influence, as politicians vocally
opine on monetary policy (and perhaps pressure central banks in other ways that are less visible), and
central bankers make efforts to build not only market credibility, but also political capital. See, e.g.,
Krishna Guha, Bernanke's Style Builds Political Capital, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at 6 (describing the
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank Chairman's successful efforts in maintaining a good relationship with
Congress and the importance this has in facilitating changes in the Fed's decision-making process).
Notwithstanding the lack of perfect insulation, central banks are relatively independent of political
influence compared to corporate crime prosecutors. It is hard to imagine a position in the central bank
catapulting one into becoming a governor or a president.
89 See BOFINGER, supra note 77, at 210-16; Vittorio Grilli et al., Political and Monetary
Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, 6 ECON. POL'Y 342, 366 (1991).
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Phelps demonstrated, the public adjusts its expectations of inflation, so that in
the long run more inflation does not allow for more growth or less
unemployment. 90 In the short run, however, reducing the money supply by
raising interest rates may reduce growth and increase unemployment.
A similar situation occurs with the enforcement of anti-fraud laws. In the
long run, the public will correct its perception gaps. It will do so more quickly
if the law enforcer does not exacerbate a positive perception gap through
conspicuous law enforcement and if the law enforcer does increase risk
perception when there is a negative perception gap.
In the short term, however, a public with a positive perception gap would
demand that immediate action be taken to address the (overestimated) risk, and
a public with a negative perception gap may be outraged by conspicuous
enforcement of anti-fraud laws that brings a stock market surge to a halt. Thus,
when conspicuous law enforcement increases risk perception, implementing the
correct long-term policy will cause fear and anger among the public in the short
term. Nonetheless, if the goal of anti-fraud laws is to maximize long term
efficiency, the public's immediate sentiments should not be a consideration for
abandoning the optimal long-term policy. In fact, the law enforcer should be
shielded from precisely these short-term pressures.
Counter-cyclical anti-fraud law enforcement does face, however, a
potential trade-off between the law's effect on potential perpetrators' incentives
and the law's effect on the general population's perceptions. As we mentioned
above, a counter-cyclical policy would advocate reducing conspicuous law
enforcement when the public has a positive perception gap, to avoid
exacerbating their already excessive perception of the risk. Refraining from
enforcing the law, however, would reduce the deterrent effect on potential
perpetrators, possibly increasing the amount of fraud committed. Similarly, the
counter-cyclical policy endorses an increase in conspicuous law enforcement
when the public has a negative perception gap, to remedy the public's
underestimation of the risk. However, increased enforcement will also increase
deterrence of potential perpetrators, perhaps excessively so. Thus, a three-way
trade-off exists between enforcement costs, enforcement's effects on the
incentives of potential perpetrators, and enforcement's effects on the
perceptions of the general public.
In addition to balancing between the three considerations that are affected
by law enforcement (cost, effect on incentives, effect on perception), a law
enforcer seeking to implement an efficient counter-cyclical policy is plagued by
the absence of a developed theoretical basis and of developed techniques to
collect relevant empirical data (such as data shedding light on the public's risk
90 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1968)
("[T]he simultaneous fall ex post in real wages ... is what enabled employment to increase. But the
decline ex post in real wages will soon come to affect anticipations. Employees will start to reckon on
rising prices of the things they buy and to demand higher nominal wages for the future.").
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perception and changes to it). The study of cognitive biases is in its infancy and
has not yet been developed to the extent that macroeconomics has.
91
One question that is of great importance to the law enforcer in crafting the
optimal enforcement policy is whether, in the particular circumstances,
conspicuous law enforcement increases or reduces risk perception. As
explained in Part II of this Article, if conspicuous law enforcement reduces risk
perception, then the law enforcer's incentives are aligned with optimal
enforcement policy. In these situations, the current system of prosecution may
be adequate. However, when law enforcement increases risk perception,
optimal enforcement policy would be counter-cyclical, and law enforcement
should be placed in the hands of enforcers who are insulated from political
pressure. We need, therefore, to improve our understanding of how individuals
interpret the bundled message in conspicuous law enforcement and when it
increases (and when it reduces) their risk perception.
Another area in which further research would dramatically improve the
effectiveness of counter-cyclical enforcement policy is the assessment of the
public's risk perception, ideally allowing an estimate of the direction (positive
or negative) and magnitude of the public's perception gap. Again, monetary
policy has faced a similar challenge in collecting reliable data that serve as
good proxies for relevant criteria. For example, the measurement of the money
supply (which is crucial in determining monetary policy) has been extensively
debated and modified several times. 92 And again, monetary policy is years
ahead of the developmental stage in which the assessment of risk perception is.
Theories on cognitive biases give some evidence as to which situations
lead to which kind of biases. It is very probable that over time these theories
will improve in sophistication and in nuance, including the ability to predict
well the effects of an interaction of multiple biases. As for empirical
measurements of risk perception, measurements based on surveys suffer from
subjectivity. One can measure the outputs of increased risk perception (in the
case of fraud: increased self-policing, increased pressure on government and
others to address the fraud and increased avoidance of activities exposing one
to fraud). However, some of these are hard to observe. One of the easier
activities to observe is changes in avoidance of activities, which, in the case of
fraud, mostly has to do with investing in capital markets. However, a reduction
91 Even macroeconomics has not yet developed into an exact science, The crafting of
monetary policy is still seen by many to be as much art as it is science. See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard,
Monetary Policy; Science or Art?, Panel Discussion at "Monetary Policy: A Journey from Theory to
Practice" Colloquium (April 2006), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/742 ("[M]onetary policy
is much closer to science than it was [twenty years ago]. But it is still very far from science."). The study
of cognitive biases for the purpose of devising optimal law enforcement policies is many steps less
advanced, though one can hope it will develop with time to be as useful a guide to the law enforcer as
macroeconomics is to the central banker.
92 See, e.g., Ulnke Dennig, Problems of Measuring Money Supply in the Euro Area, 33
INTERECONOMIcs 299 (1998) (discussing the lack of a measurement standard for the euro area money
supply just before responsibility for monetary policy was transferred to the European Central Bank in
1998)
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in such investments, while possibly a result of heightened risk perception, may
also be a result of changes in the relative costs or effectiveness of the
alternative responses to the risk. For example, an individual's risk perception
may have increased, but at the same time the individual anticipates that the
costs of self-policing (or influencing the government to intervene) have
declined, making them more attractive than avoiding the risk, and therefore
displacing risk avoidance in the individual's mix of responses. One can predict
that, as with any area to which human ingenuity is applied, better measurement
techniques and better proxies would form if there were a demand for them. This
demand should come, in part, from counter-cyclical law enforcers.
2. Instrument Independence
Independence to set a counter-cyclical law enforcement policy is
meaningless if others, who are not isolated from political pressures and
therefore have an incentive to endorse cyclical enforcement, have the ability to
thwart the law enforcer. This problem is acute in the case of manipulating the
public's risk perceptions, since so many individuals and entities can and do
engage in such activities. First of all, there is a multitude of government actors
whose actions affect the perception of fraud. Witness the aftermath of the
recent financial scandals, in which the SEC, multiple federal district attorneys,
and multiple state attorneys general actively competed over the spotlight for
charges they pressed against alleged wrongdoers.
The simplest way to curb this competition is to allocate all prosecutorial
authority in the hands of a single entity (say, the SEC), insulate that entity to
the best extent possible from political pressure, and preempt other government
bodies from taking actions that would have a severe impact on the public's
perception of the risk of corporate fraud. A more moderate reform would leave
the multitude of prosecutors with their existing powers, but require them to
receive approval to file their charges from a single, politically insulated entity
that will serve as an "expert grand jury." Though this reform is less dramatic, I
am skeptical about its effectiveness because prosecutors can generate the
perception effects of conspicuous law enforcement simply by (very publicly)
filing charges with the "expert grand jury." Even if those charges would be
dismissed, the prosecutor may receive the private benefits of public attention
for her devotion to fighting fraud (just as the public may be more aware of a
prosecutor's very public announcement of the filing of charges and of
conspicuous "perp walks" than of the ultimate outcome of the trial, which the
prosecutor might not publicize if she lost).
A law enforcer may be thwarted not only by the actions of other
government entities, but also by the actions of private entities. For example, the
media has a very significant role in shaping risk perceptions.93 Private firms
93 See Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 817-21.
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that actively operate in capital markets have an effect on changes in market
prices and on the resulting perception of relevant risks. Preventing them from
acting and expressing views that trigger cognitive biases and manipulate
perceptions would likely run afoul of the First Amendment. Thus, the law
enforcer has to live with some interference from private parties. In this, she is
not alone. The central banker, too, does not have unfettered control of the
market behavior. In one case, for example, a central bank's policies were
challenged by speculators who took market positions adverse to the bank's
policies, and in some cases the speculators won, causing the central bank to
lose billions in an (ultimately futile) attempt to enforce its policy.
94
But central banks have some degree of control over these private actors
through their credibility. Their policy serves as a focal point, and as long as
they have the market's confidence, they control the private actors by "dividing
and conquering"-each private actor normally does not have enough financial
power to undermine the central bank's position on its own, and if the central
bank has credibility, each private actor is likely to expect that other actors
would not challenge the bank's policy, making it too risky for that actor to
challenge the bank. As The Economist describes it:
Central banks have become more open largely because of a change in the way
monetary policy is thought to work. The old view of it was rather mechanical
.... Now policy is thought to operate mainly through expectations. Central
banks see the setting of today's interest rates as part of a wider task: giving
markets, consumers and firms reason to expect that future rates will keep
inflation in bounds. If they believe inflation will stay at, say, 2% or so, they will
act accordingly and thus help to hold it near the mark.
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An expert corporate crime agency may eam the same respect and exert the
same influence on private parties' expectations. For example, lawyers
contemplating private lawsuits against a company may refrain from doing so
when the agency expresses its view that public action against the company is
inappropriate and that the perception of fraud is, in this case, exaggerated. The
lawyers would do so not necessarily out of respect to the agency, but out of
recognition that others (including the judge and jury in their case) would be
influenced by the agency's position, reducing the lawyers' likelihood of
success. The same influence can be exerted in the opposite direction, inducing
lawyers to file private lawsuits when the agency signals through its actions that
greater concern for fraud is in order.
96
94 See Daniel Dombey, The Billion-Dollar Memory Lapse: George Soros Has Moved on to
Higher Things Since Black Wednesday 1992, When He Broke the Bank of England and Made a
Fortune-or Was It a Thursday?, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at 14 (interviewing Soros nearly twenty-five
years after he "made [one billion dollars] in a day by betting against the Bank of England").
95 The Oracle Becomes Less Oracular, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 2006, at 80.
96 See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and
the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) ("In
each case, government lawsuits broke down the barriers to successful litigation, and private litigants,
particularly those pursuing class actions, rode the government's coattails.").
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3. Personal Independence
Central banks enjoy a degree of personal independence through features
that shield decision makers from political influence that affects their present or
future personal well-being (e.g., the ability of a politician to fire a central
banker who is not beholden to her, or the central banker's temptation of
desirable future employment that would emerge only if he yields to certain
political interests). In contrast to central bankers, many of the prosecutors who
enforce corporate crime laws (and therefore have an effect on the perception of
the risk of fraud) are in positions that are extremely susceptible to political
pressure. Some even use a conspicuous "corporate busting" record as a
prosecutor to launch political careers.97 This vulnerability to political pressures
makes them unlikely to sustain a counter-cyclical enforcement policy when it is
needed.
Structural safeguards protect certain government actors such as judges and
central bank board of governors members from political pressures. Such
mechanisms include political diversification in the nomination and
confirmation processes, staggered terms of office, tenure or term appointments
with strict limitations on removal, restrictions on future employment (to
prevent the position from being a springboard to a political career), etc. Many
of these are easily applicable to a single agency that specializes in counter-
cyclical law enforcement (i.e., enforcing the law in areas in which the public's
risk perception fluctuates cyclically and in which conspicuous law enforcement
increases risk perception). It would likely not be possible to extend these
safeguards to a large, decentralized group of prosecutors at different
governmental levels (federal, state, and local). This is yet another reason to
consider investing counter-cyclical law enforcement in the hands of a single
entity rather than in the current decentralized structure.
IV. Conclusion
Optimal law enforcement efforts are often presumed to be constant,
fluctuating only when the balance between enforcement costs and deterrence
benefits fluctuates due to a change in one of these two factors.
This paper added a third factor that significantly impacts the social
welfare effects of law enforcement: the effect of law enforcement on the
public's perception of the risk the law purports to address. This expansion of
the optimal enforcement model allowed me to introduce a macroeconomic
97 See Jenny Anderson, About Those Fears of Wall Street's Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2007, at C6 (reporting on Eliot Spitzer, "the enforcer turned laissez-faire governor" of New York who
"not long ago was a prosecutor blazing through Wall Street's boardrooms"); Weston Kosova, Keeping a
Close Eve on Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 2003, at 94, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.coni/
id/3770497/site/newsweek/ (reporting on Spitzer's "crusade to expose Wall Street's grimy side ... [or]
Wall Street war [that] made him one of the most envied politicians in the country").
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element to the microeconomic analysis of optimal law enforcement-the
cyclical fluctuation of the public's risk perception. Introducing this cyclical
element highlighted the importance of a currently neglected question: under
what circumstances does conspicuous law enforcement reduce risk perception,
and when does it increase risk perception? This determines the optimal
enforcement policy: a cyclical policy when law enforcement reduces risk
perception and a counter-cyclical policy when law enforcement increases risk
perception.
Anti-fraud corporate and securities laws seem to be enforced cyclically. I
suggest that this trend is connected with the cyclical fluctuation in the public's
risk perception, because through law enforcement the agencies engage in bias
arbitrage that yields private profits. Thus, law enforcers have an incentive to
enforce anti-fraud laws cyclically, which is likely the optimal policy when
conspicuous law enforcement reduces risk perception.
But when conspicuous law enforcement increases risk perception, a
counter-cyclical policy is more efficient. Yet law enforcers still face the same
incentives to enforce law cyclically. In the final part of this paper, I examined
existing counter-cyclical government policies (in particular, monetary policy
implemented by a central bank) to determine what elements insulate law
enforcers from the perverse incentives to enforce cyclically, and I suggested
how these elements could be applied in the context of enforcing corporate anti-
fraud laws.
This Article highlights the importance of empirical and experimental
research that will identify when law enforcement increases risk perception and
when it reduces it. It creates the framework for an application---counter-
cyclical enforcement of corporate and securities laws-the effectiveness of
which depends on the quality of our understanding of the effect of law
enforcement on risk perception. In effect, this Article creates a "prize" to
induce scholars to explore this question and to reward those who improve our
understanding of the relationship between law and risk perception. As such
understanding develops, law enforcement will be better able to manage an
important effect of law enforcement that is largely neglected in the extant
literature on optimal law enforcement: law enforcement's effect on the risk
perception of potential victims. This Article takes the first steps in envisioning
what structural reforms would be desirable in our law enforcement institutions
in order to efficiently manage these perception effects.

